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Abstract 
 
 
The Egyptian housing sector suffers from a number of deficiencies. Among 
these is the lack of an efficient housing finance mechanism. The mortgage market, 
formally developed in 2001, is still at nascent stages and is unable to provide such a 
mechanism for a large majority of would-be or actual buyers. This study examines the 
reasons behind the failure of the mortgage market to grow and thrive.  It presents a 
qualitative analysis based on extensive interviews with the players in the mortgage 
market, including regulators, lenders and real-estate developers. It assesses the current 
market standing and identifies the barriers to the mortgage market and 
recommendations to overcome those barriers. Institutional immaturity and security 
measures are addressed at the core of problem as possible hypotheses to answer why 
mortgages are not more widespread. Through the intensive interviews, it is learned 
that there are specific barriers to mortgages as a housing finance mechanism. These 
barriers include, but are not limited to, the infrastructure associated with legal 
documentation and property registration; minimal mortgage education; hindrance in 
foreclosure policy and procedure; lack of an institutional leader; a limited secondary 
market; and an overall underexposure of Egyptian culture to mortgages. Market 
players participating in research offer recommendations that would improve the state 
of the mortgage market and overcome some of the barriers. Recommendations 
include nationwide awareness efforts, possibly starting with basic financial education 
at the school level; more promotion by regulators of the mortgage market; creation of 
mortgage-specific notaries; standardization of mortgage documents; and market 
synchronization through the establishment of a single national mortgage agency. This 
research demonstrates the importance of policy that is harmonious with existing 
supply of a commodity, in this case, housing, and the associated infrastructure. 
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I. Introduction 
 Policy study becomes important in several scenarios: when it can solve a 
problem, when it can create a problem, or when it hinders the solution to a problem. 
In this research, the third scenario is applicable. If we were to look at housing finance 
mechanisms to address housing shortages in Egypt, we would find that current 
mortgage policy is hindering that process. This research addresses how current policy 
is hindering the mortgage market and what can be done, or recommendations.  
 The mortgage market in Egypt is relatively new, formally active only since 
2004. While other forms of housing finance have been practiced before the emergence 
of a mortgage market, this specific mechanism was chosen as it is the most common 
form of housing finance worldwide, and one that has not yet taken full and final shape 
in Egypt. According to research, only about a third of demand for housing is annually 
being met in Egypt. Mortgages may not be the ultimate solution to the housing 
problem but the mechanism has proven an efficient method of allowing at least those 
who should be able to own homes to do so. An efficient mortgage market does not 
only positively reflect on housing affordability and thus availability, it also has a 
positive impact on the financial market, especially through the creation of a secondary 
market. Furthermore, availability of housing finance may decrease the resort to 
informal housing in the long run, which implies a social and urban development 
benefit. Benefits of an efficient mortgage market are to be discussed in later sections, 
but it is important to mention a few to better explain the purpose of this research. 
 While literature on the mortgage market in Egypt was found to be very limited, 
it provided vital insights and greatly guided the primary part of research. Primary 
research depended on the market players and pioneers of the mortgage market, who 
provided insight on the tangible problems and barriers to the mortgage market as well 
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as realistic recommendations. This research was conducted with the aim and the hope 
that policy research can be used to solve modern-day problems that come with 
overpopulation, bureaucracy, and the many aspects of inefficient markets. 
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II. Statement of the Problem 
 
The housing shortage in Egypt is not only evident in the lack of required units 
to house population, but also in the lack of affordability of units. For the employed 
Egyptian earning a moderate to minimum amount each month, buying a finished unit 
is almost always out of the question. This is due to the lack of an efficient home 
financing mechanism. Internationally, the most popular form of home financing is 
mortgages. Without mortgages, lower and middle-income groups in Egypt cannot buy 
homes (Carleton, P. Everhart, S. & Heybey, B. 2006). While some developers offer 
installment payment plans, it is not enough. Most private developers were attracted to 
the upscale real estate boom of the 1980s (Loza 2004) creating an undersupply of 
affordable housing as well as a mismatch of supply and demand. This mismatch takes 
the form of unoccupied upper scale units and housing shortage in lower-scale units. 
Compared to other North Africa countries, Egypt has the lowest rate of owner-
occupied property and the highest ratio of civilians in the informal housing sector 
(Carleton, P., Everhart, S., & Heybey, B. 2006). The problem is serious when officials 
at the Cairo Governorate have been cited to claim that one-fifth of Cairo’s residents 
live in informal areas at the edges of the city (McKee 1999).  
Since the adoption of the Mortgage Law in 2001, the housing sector has been 
open to mortgage finance. However, mortgages are not yet widespread in Egypt, 
despite the dire need of the housing sector for a financing mechanism. The Central 
Bank of Egypt (CBE) strictly regulates banks, which are the primary lenders. Most of 
real estate lending goes to developers, which are at the supply end, rather than to 
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purchasers, at the demand end (Regulatory agency officer. Personal Communication, 
20121). 
Although many researchers have addressed both housing and mortgages in 
Egypt, one question, with several parts to it, remains unanswered: why is mortgage 
finance not more widespread in Egypt, even though the housing sector is in dire need 
of an efficient financing mechanism on the demand side, and what can be done, and 
by whom, to make mortgages more widespread among the segment of population that 
need it most? 
There are indications in literature as to what the problems with mortgages are, 
but there is an absence of a definitive reasons, or set of reasons. A possible answer (or 
hypothesis) could be that there is a lack of security on all sides involved that results in 
a trend away from mortgages. ‘All sides’ refers to clients that are unexposed to banks 
and financing as well as inexperienced lenders. Lenders refuse to take on borrowers 
with low or no credit rating, and as long as clients do not deal with banks and 
borrowing, they will never have a decent credit rating, and thus the cycle begins. Also 
contributing to this cycle is the lack of security and confidence in a population 
accustomed to haphazard changes and amendments to laws and policies. The 
pervasive possibility of regulatory changes discourages investments made over long 
periods such as mortgages. Although more specific reasons for mortgages not being 
more widespread many of which will be tackled in this research, the lack of some 
form of security will come up as one of the main drivers behind many of these 
reasons. Another possible hypothesis lies in the level of development of the mortgage 
market. As an institution, mortgages are relatively new, with the law implemented 
                                                
1 All regulatory agency officer, bank officer, mortgage company officer citations are 
personal communications completed in 2012 This information will therefore not be 
repeated in subsequent references to material gathered in interviews. 
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only in 2004. The mortgage product is still at a nascent stage and is not yet mature 
enough to be a leading source of housing finance. Experts have repeatedly argued that 
it is this immaturity of the Egyptian mortgage market that saved it from being 
shocked as hard by the global financial crisis of 2009 as more developed markets 
(Bank offier). The crisis shocked markets that had been active for decades, while the 
Egyptian market was still only in its fifth year of operation. This is not only true for 
the mortgage market, but also for the financial market as a whole, which is still at a 
rudimentary stage as demonstrated by following research. 
It can also be argued that the lack of mortgage finance is due to a combination 
of security concerns and institutional immaturity. More specifically, security issues 
for lenders and borrowers are most likely due to institutional immaturity. There is the 
possibility of a vicious cycle being created between the two factors: the mortgage 
institution is not developed enough for solid security guarantees and it will never 
reach a more developed stage without stronger security guarantees. A more definitive 
view on security and institutional immaturity will be determined through research, but 
it is likely that the answer to why mortgage finance is not more widespread in Egypt 
is one of or a combination of the two. 
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III. Literature Review  
A. Housing and mortgage status 
1. Housing and link to development 
 Empirical studies have shown that there is a relationship among land 
distribution, poverty and economic growth (Carleton, P. Everhart, S. & Heybey, B. 
2006). Former Egyptian Minister of Investment Mahmoud Mohieldin, Chairman of 
General Authority for Investment, Ziad Bahaa Eldin and Sahar Nasr, from The World 
Bank, conducted a study for the Economic Research Forum of the Arab Countries, 
Iran and Turkey. Their research cites similar findings. The authors note that real estate 
and its finance are essential elements of economic development. Also, urbanization, 
economic growth and capital formation are entwined processes (Bahaa Eldin, 
Mohieldin, Nasr 2004). The Investment Authority, the official body in charge of 
licensing new companies, states that  real estate is the third largest sector in Egypt, 
after manufacturing and tourism (E.S. McKee 1999).  
 With the establishment of the importance of land and real estate and their 
impact on development, it is important to recognize what impact of the improvement 
of housing finance would have on economic development. Improved housing finance 
would support economic development through several channels. It would increase 
savings, investment and employment. It would also work to strengthen and deepen the 
financial sector and work to reduce poverty. With all the channels in mind, the 
development of the housing market cannot reach its fullest potential without a fully 
functioning mortgage market. This has been proven though international experiences, 
which show that living standards increase when there is widespread availability of 
mortgages, because of the positive impacts mortgages have on housing quality, 
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infrastructure and urbanization (Carleton, P. Everhart, S. & Heybey, B. 2006). Other 
researchers present work with similar findings.  
S. Nuri Erbas and Frank E. Nothaft's study of on Middle East mortgage 
markets cites two reasons in support of the impact of widespread mortgage 
availability on achievement of redistributive and growth-enhancing policy objectives. 
First, there is an important subsidy element- in the form of preferential interest rates 
and tax treatment in many mortgage markets- in programs to extend home mortgage 
lending to groups that cannot otherwise afford mortgages. Second, that widespread 
availability of mortgages may enhance savings, promote financial market 
development and stimulate investment in the housing sector (Erbas and Nothaft, 
September 2005). Their research also presents evidence from developed countries 
showing that increased access to affordable mortgages produces positive externalities 
for low and middle income groups who already own property by upgrading their 
property and allowing investment into other ventures, such as shops (Erbas and 
Nothaft, September 2005). Further discussion of positive externalities, in the two 
studies above suggests that housing finance makes room for new housing 
construction, more jobs are created for low and middle income workers in this labor-
intensive field both in the actual construction and in related service sectors (Erbas and 
Nothaft, September 2005 and Carleton, P. Everhart, S. & Heybey, B. 2006). Before 
positive externalities can be realized, details to consider include mass urban property 
registration and the use of mortgages for home purchases are both still at early stages 
in Egypt and the first step is for the Egyptian consumer to understand these 
instruments (Struyk, December 2007). 
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2. Comparisons 
 Several researchers have compared the standing of Egypt’s mortgage markets 
to similar markets. For example, research by Stephen Butler (University of Chicago), 
Mariya Kravkova (International Finance Corporation) and Mehnaz Safavian (The 
World Bank) has indicated that mortgage financing amounts to less than 1% of GDP 
in Egypt while it stands at 10% of GDP in Mexico, 39% of GDP in South Africa and 
more than 85% of GDP in New Zealand. The differences in percentages come from 
the difficulties buyers face in registering a mortgage and transferring titles. Creditors 
also face more difficulties when buyers default on payments (Butler, Kravkova and 
Safavian, 2009). When compared to some MENA countries, specifically Tunisia, 
Algeria, Jordan, and Morocco, Egypt has the lowest rate of owner-occupied property 
and highest ratio of civilians in both public and informal housing. Also, the public 
sector owns 29% of all housing in urban areas, compared to 25% in Algeria and only 
8% in Tunisia (Carleton, P. Everhart, S. & Heybey, B. 2006). Comparisons to the 
MENA region are important due to influence of the Shariah Law on the region, which 
forbids the giving and receiving of interest and thus set back the widespread use of 
mortgage finance instruments. Islamic banking offers a form of Islamic mortgages 
where a bank buys the property then leases it to the buyer with part of the payment 
going towards the purchase (Bergsman 2006). However, the recent experience with 
housing bubbles, exemplified in the US mortgage market collapse, emphasizes the 
need to design the mortgage market carefully to avoid fueling speculation (Boleat 
2003). 
3. Demand for and lack of affordable housing 
 While, housing and construction comes to almost 50% of the Egyptian 
government’s investments according to 2006 figures (Carleton, P. Everhart, S. & 
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Heybey, B. 2006), there is a higher proportion of informal housing and a lower 
proportion of home ownership than comparable counties. This is partially due to the 
lack of an effective housing finance mechanism, but it also contributes to the 
continuing lack of said mechanism (Boleat 2003). Part of the reason for this lack of 
affordable housing is that high returns on investment in upper-scale units during the 
1980s led to an oversupply of upscale housing and thus a lack of interest on the 
developers’ side in the lower end of the market (Loza 2004). Along the same lines, 
some researchers believe that the responsibility of developing mortgage finance 
should be separated from the responsibility of low income housing in the sense that 
social obligation should not be imposed on lenders or developers (Bahaa Eldin, 
Mohieldin, Nasr, 2004). Ibrahim Fawzy, Chairman of the Egyptian Investment 
Authority claims, “It is not he responsibility of the private sector to protect the poor 
and middle classes. But once the luxury market is saturated, they [the investors] 
would naturally move to meet the demands of those sectors” (Boleat 2003).  
 Other researchers claim the problem has a different root: it is not in the lack of 
housing stock rather it is the lack of affordable housing. There is a mismatch of 
supply and demand in Egypt, excess inventory of medium and high end properties 
while demand is for low income housing. This is based on research by the Middle 
East Ratings and Investors Service (MERIS), which estimates that total annual 
demand for housing units is approximately 750,000 units while the total supply that is 
available to the formal real estate market was only 260,000 units in 2004 – which is 
only about 35% of demand (Carleton, P. Everhart, S. & Heybey, B. 2006). Other 
studies present different figures that still lead to the same supply/demand mismatch. 
For example, Samir Makary, professor of Economics at the American University in 
Cairo, estimates that only about 100,000 units are affordable out of 260,000 units 
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needed annually to accommodate population growth (Carleton, P. Everhart, S. & 
Heybey, B. 2006). Another research claims that with an estimated increase in housing 
demand of about 250,000 to 300,000 units annually, only 180,000 (60-70%) was met 
through formal housing in 1998, as opposed to the 35% of demand met in the 2006 
research. Of those 180,000 units, about 70% were classified as low cost, and half of 
which were built through government’s subsidized housing program (Erbas and 
Nothaft, 2005). However the figures vary, the fact remains that without broad access 
to mortgage financing, low and middle-income households cannot afford to buy 
homes in the formal sector so are diverted to the informal sector. While that solves the 
problem of putting families in homes, it creates a bigger one when these properties 
cannot be titled and registered (Carleton, P. Everhart, S. & Heybey, B. 2006). 
4. Mortgage laws and status 
 A central problem with the lack of formal housing finance mechanisms is that 
it prevents those who should be able to own homes from doing so (Boleat 2003). 
Other researchers make similar arguments that, without mortgages, low- and middle-
income groups cannot buy homes whereas a house is often the primary investment 
and savings tool for those groups (Carleton, P. Everhart, S. & Heybey, B. 2006). 
More analysts confirm this such as Al Ahram writer Pierre Loza who writes that the 
high cost of living constrains long-term savings, which would otherwise flow into the 
real estate market (Loza 2004). Investments by these groups, who should be able to 
buy property given a proper finance system, are not only used for homes; real estate 
investment can also be in the form of retail space and small business. Whatever the 
property is used for, when members of these economic groups save for a purchase, 
down payment or even loan repayment, there is an increase in the assets available to 
the financial service sector and demand for more financial services. Researchers also 
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note that housing is the biggest expense for those income groups; it accounts for about 
50-70% of their budgets. If housing finance were available, it would allow these 
groups to use their resources for other opportunities, such as small businesses 
(Carleton, P. Everhart, S. & Heybey, B. 2006). Comparable findings are presented by 
Erbas and Nothaft, who add that large groups of households are generally regarded 
poor credit risk by lenders. Also, these households can have their finances constrained 
in two ways: they are unable to afford a down payment and/or they are unable to 
access capital markets for long-term mortgage loans (Erbas and Nothaft 2005). 
 Researchers also address real estate policy and laws that have had an effect on 
the mortgage market. Changes to real estate market laws that resulted in the status quo 
today began in 1996 with Law No. 4 of rent and real estate. This change ended the 
indefinite passage of tenure from tenant to heirs, limiting rent contracts to a definite 
period of time with no restriction on price other than it being previously agreed upon 
(Loza 2004). In 2001, the Mortgage Finance Authority (MFA) was created by 
presidential decree to stimulate and regulate mortgage lending by lenders other than 
commercial banks (Struyk 2007). This led to the Real Estate Finance Law of the same 
year, which contains a strict definition of the loan instrument, specified to be a three-
party agreement between the buyer, the lender, and the seller of a property (Struyk 
and Brown 2006). Everhart, Heybey and Carleton closely examine the 2001 Mortgage 
Law, which was not implemented until 2004. Its initial goal was to enable borrowers 
to make a 20% down payment and pay installments for duration of twenty to thirty 
years. Under the law, buyers would receive titles and lenders would be able to 
foreclose on a property in case of default for six to nine months. It is modeled after 
US mortgage regulations. It allows financing from bank and non-bank lenders but the 
two are regulated differently. Non-bank lenders operate similar to banks but are not 
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limited by strict regulations and lending percentages (Carleton, P. Everhart, S. & 
Heybey, B. 2006).  
 Researchers who address mortgage in Egypt examine the current market 
players. In 2005, operations started with two non-depository mortgage finance 
companies specializing in housing loans. In 2007, there were two government-owned 
commercial banks active in making loans and down payment subsidies to moderate-
income first-time purchasers (Struyk 2007). Current players include four firms: Al 
Taameer, Egyptian Housing Finance Company (EHFC), National Societe Generale 
Bank (NSGB), and the Arab Investment Bank. Al Taamir has an authorized capital of 
$86.2 million and is owned by a consortium of Egyptian public and private banks. 
EHFC is split up between the International Finance Corporation- of The World Bank- 
(20%), Egyptian banks (50%), the German Company for Investment and 
Development (20%), and the Indian Mortgage Finance Corporation with the final 
10% (Carleton, P. Everhart, S. & Heybey, B. 2006). Other players include a 
cooperation between the Egyptian-Arab Land Bank ad the Housing Development 
bank, which offer loan terms between ten and twenty years. As government-owned 
institutions that report to the Ministry of Housing, these two banks are also involved 
in the national program to provide low-cost housing units on loan terms that include a 
non-repayable subsidy for a portion of the required down payment (Struyk and Brown 
2006). The general guidelines for all lenders include that house purchase loans can 
either be made at a fixed interest rate for the period of the loan or for adjustable rates 
under sub-periods or at variable rates within the interest rate according to the cost of 
funds (Boleat 2003). Even though the mortgage law aims for loan periods between 
twenty and thirty years, the actual loan terms by Taameer and EHFC average about 
seven to eight and a half years (Struyk and Brown 2006). By the end of 2005, four 
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years after the mortgage law and one year after its implementation, the value of deals 
approved came to approximately LE 16 million and reached LE 1.4 billion two years 
later. Much credit for this increase has been due to the head of the Mortgage Finance 
Authority, Chairman Osama Saleh (The Economist,  2007). Struyk and Brown note 
the size of individual loans. Their research claims that the actual loan amounts are 
very large, coming to an average of LE 232,000 per purchase where the household 
income is about LE 41,000, indicating that mortgage loans are going to high income 
households (Struyk and Brown 2006). 
 Several researchers agree on the constraints to a better functioning mortgage 
market. For example, Struyk and Brown regard probable delays and an uncertain 
foreclosure process as the sources of difficulties (Struyk and Brown 2006). Everhart, 
Heybey and Carleton also agree, and add on more sources of difficulties. In addition 
to registration and foreclosure issues, extending bank credit to the housing sector, lack 
of valuation information, lack of credit risk information, and complex regulation all 
serve to constrain the mortgage market (Carleton, P. Everhart, S. & Heybey, B. 2006). 
As broad as these issues appear, when taken apart and considered individually they 
represent even wider obstacles. For example, if banks are limited on how much credit 
they can extend to housing, they would pick borrowers with the lowest default risk, 
which are not always those who need to benefit from housing finance plans. 
B. Mortgage versus installments  
Before there were mortgages inEgypt, the most popular option that avoided full 
payments were installment plans. Struyk (2007) compares installments and mortgages 
in his study of Egyptian consumer knowledge. He finds that, in the years before the 
introduction of mortgages, home purchase finance was limited to installment sales by 
developers, and using the savings of or borrowing from members of family and 
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friends. Given the limits to such funding,  only the very rich and those who had made 
enough money in businesses and in the Gulf could afford to buy into real estate 
projects, which were out of reach for the majority of the population (McKee 1999). 
Developers' installment plans generally imply an effective interest rate of about 20% 
compared to an average of 15% for a regular mortgage rate (Bahaa Eldin, Mohieldin, 
and Nasr, 2004). As a result of difficult installment requirements and other barriers to 
housing access for many families, a fifth of Cairo’s residents live in dozens of shanty-
towns around the city, according to officials at the Cairo Governorate (McKee 1999).  
Research points out the many disadvantages to the buyer that are associated with 
developer installment plans. First, installments are wholly unregulated, which make 
them subject to abuse. Also, developers require large down payments, which are often 
broken up into installments themselves. A critical disadvantage is that with 
installment plans, the buyer is usually unable to occupy the unit immediately. Most 
developers require an average of about 70% before the unit can be occupied, even 
assuming the unit is structurally finished when sold. After the unit is turned over, the 
buyer is generally expected to invest large sums to complete work that is the 
developer's responsibility in most other markets, ranging from installing fixtures and 
appliances to plastering and painting the walls and finishing the floors. Financing for 
these expenditures is only now being offered by a limited number of financers.  When 
it comes to the individual installments, actual interest rates are hard to determine since 
the unit sales process includes both the cost of the unit, which is set by the developer, 
and the financing (Struyk 2007). Boleat also agrees with Struyk, citing that developer 
interest rates are expensive, set higher than a reasonable mortgage interest rate (Boleat 
2003). While the installments are being paid, the title of the property remains with the 
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developer, until payment completion. This is to the disadvantage of the buyer, who is 
paying for the purchase but is not entitled to the unit (Struyk 2007). 
Installment plans are also to the disadvantage of the seller, or the developer, not 
just the buyer, though in fewer ways. For example, installment plans tie up capital for 
the developer, who would otherwise use payments from one project to finance another 
(Boleat 2003). Also developers only offer installment plans when the housing market 
stagnates and forces them to cut prices and devise less demanding payment plans in 
order to recoup their original investment. In the stagnation of 2004, the depreciation 
of the Egyptian Pound hindered them from doing even that (Loza 2004).  
 
 
 
C. Registration 
 
 Egypt’s property registration system has been described as, “onerous and 
expensive for applications, vastly underutilized, excessively bureaucratic and 
complex, misunderstood and unpopular with the public, and incapable in current for 
of promoting a real estate mortgage market” (Struyk 2007). As a result, most houses 
are built on lands that are not registered, and that puts more knots in the complexity of 
registering real estate (Bahaa Eldin, Mohieldin, Nasr, 2004). The real, tangible 
problem associated with unregistered property arises in what owners can and cannot 
do with their property. If owners, or residents, do not have a formal title to the 
property, they cannot use it as collateral for other investments (Struyk and Brown 
2006).  
 Part of the difficulty of property registration is time frame. Registering a 
mortgage and title transfer can take up to 193 days in Egypt. Delays in the process 
may be due to various factors, such as the operational infrastructure of the registration 
system, the bureaucratic process itself, the capacity of the registration staff, or the 
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overall legal environment  (Butler, Kravkova, and Safavian, 2009). To avoid such 
long delays in mortgages that are due to registration issues, the Real Estate Finance 
Law of 2001 was amended in 2005. A mortgage could be issued for an unregistered 
property if the property were deemed to qualify for registration. This change 
dramatically increased the number of properties eligible for mortgage loans (Struyk 
and Brown 2006).  
 Another problematic aspect of registration is cost. Registration fees used to be 
as high as 12% of the property’s value. Over several years, they were reduced until 
2006. In 2006, fees were set at a minimum of LE 500 and a maximum of LE 2,000. 
The actual fee would depend on the property size in square meter (Struyk 2007).  
 Bahaa Eldin, Mohieldin, and Nasr in their research for The World Bank 
outline the requirements for an efficient and comprehensive real estate registry 
system, which they claim is a prime requirement for a mortgage market. According to 
them, the system must be efficient in the sense that it allows the transfer of ownership 
in a timely manner. It must be inexpensive so fees do not prohibit registration. It also 
must be comprehensive, in the sense that all properties should become either 
registered or eligible for registration. It must be uncomplicated so that all properties 
are registered when a certain reasonable procedure is followed. Finally, it must be 
definite in the sense that once registration is complete, it may not be challenged, 
annulled or doubted (Bahaa Eldin, Mohieldin, Nasr, 2004). Other research confirm 
the importance of such an efficient registration system, citing that inefficiency in 
property registration can create a bottleneck in the overall housing finance system 
(Butler, Kravkova, and Safavian, 2009). 
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D. Foreclosure 
 
 According to research, foreclosure is an important concept in mortgage 
because it balances the rights of lenders and borrowers in the even of a loan default. 
However, laws in some countries grant excessive protection to borrowers who may 
have fallen on hard times and that protection may impose large costs on lenders. As a 
result, lenders may adjust lending rates to these costs, with the outcome being higher 
interest rates, larger down payments or credit rationing for the overall market (Butler, 
Kravkova, and Safavian, 2009).  
Some works compare foreclosure in mortgage to eviction in rent. Pierre Loza 
of Al Ahram claims that eviction is even difficult in rent. A landlord would only be 
able to evict tenants in four cases: if the tenants convert residential units to non-
residential use without the landlord’s consent, if the tenant sublets the unit without the 
landlord’s consent, if the tenant fails to pay rent fifteen days after it is due, or if the 
building or unit collapses (Loza 2004). It is always undesirable for anyone to lose a 
home because of inability to repay a loan, but when laws make security for lenders 
impossible, housing finance is prevented in the first place. Interest rates rise out of the 
reach of many consumers as the lenders try to ensure their own security. Therefore, 
potential borrowers would have to resort to other means of finance, such as developer 
installments, or are barred from the market (Boleat 2003). Other research confirms 
this, noting that in practice, mortgages carry the interest rate of unsecured loans 
(Bahaa Eldin, Mohieldin, Nasr, 2004). 
E. Professional training and mortgage education 
 
 Within the region, Egypt and Turkey are still attempting a full, national 
unveiling of a mortgage system, while cities like Doha and Abu Dhabi are at the 
forefront of the mortgages in the Middle East (Bergsman 2006). When it comes to 
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consumer knowledge of the national mortgage system, research shows that the 
Egyptian consumer has more specific knowledge of mortgage than of property 
registration, because mortgages are relatively new and are receiving attention (Struyk 
2007). Struyk conducted a survey on consumer knowledge with a sample of 505 
middle and upper middle-income Egyptian families, all of whom are either recent of 
potential home purchasers. Results include that 85% reflect high levels of knowledge 
about inability to have multiple mortgages on the same property; 90% know about the 
requirement for a mortgage to be registered; only about 40-45% know that a likely 
consequence of default is foreclosure. Results also show that potential borrowers have 
negative reactions to the present high interest rates and the prospect of carrying long-
term debt (Struyk 2007).  
 Bahaa Eldin, Mohieldin, and Nasr also address valuation, an important aspect 
of mortgage training and education in the World Bank research. They claim that there 
is no consistent approach to property valuation, limiting the use of the whole process. 
In more developed countries, valuation is simple: valuation specialists identify the 
price of recently sold comparable properties. However the lack of a strong housing 
market in the Middle East adds to the difficulty of valuing houses on the market, a 
task that requires skilled specialists. While it may seem like a good idea, valuation 
based on the cost of construction is not advisable, since in the long-term, the 
relationship between the price of a unit and the cost of building it is not strong. In 
active real estate markets, the price of a finished unit can increase more rapidly than 
the increase in the cost of construction, and the opposite is true in a depressed market 
(Bahaa Eldin, Mohieldin, Nasr, 2004). 
 Several international agencies have taken part in developing programs to 
enhance Egypt’s mortgage market. USAID started a five-year project composed of 
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four parts: legal reform and technical assistance and training to lenders; 
modernization of the property registration process in urban areas (with pilot projects 
in two districts in Cairo to create a systematic title registry template); establishment of 
a credit information system to assist lenders in assessing risk; and the development of 
a broader range of financial instruments for the capital markets. The project is 
implemented by US agency Chemonics International Inc, and is providing assistance 
to the Ministry of Justice for property registration, the Ministry of Investment for the 
Mortgage Finance Authority, the Capital Market Authority, and the Central Bank of 
Egypt for credit information service (Carleton, P. Everhart, S. & Heybey, B. 2006). 
Other research cites the same program with more participants.  
 Bergsman's study of Middle East mortgages cites the program undertaken by  
CampusMBA (the educational division of the Mortgage Bankers Association in the 
US), contracted by USAID to develop training programs in cooperation with 
Chemonics. In May 2005, CampusMBA had its first visit to Egypt to better 
understand the course and curriculum as well as the needs of banks and the Egyptian 
Mortgage Authority. CampusMBA sends Certified Mortgage Bankers, who are senior 
level mortgage industry executives, to Cairo. The program started with the Egyptian 
Primary Market Course on the basis of mortgage banking, delivered in both Arabic 
and English. The goal of the program’s initial phase was to create a core group of 
Egyptian mortgage professionals who could recreate and repeat the training 
(Bergsman 2006).  
 Also involved in training programs is the World Bank, which is involved with 
the Egyptian government on a program to expand property registration based on 
lessons from the USAID pilot project mentioned above. The US Appraisal Institute is 
helping to train and certify appraisers (Carleton, P. Everhart, S. & Heybey, B. 2006). 
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Research cites the importance of analytical results from a policy perspective as 
important because they inform policymakers and lenders the effectiveness of 
educational campaigns (Struyk 2007). 
F. Banks and banking 
 Although there are different models of housing finance systems, all of them 
are based on banking systems in practice. Mortgage lending is thus only a special type 
of bank lending where loans can be financed by retail deposits or wholesale funds. 
Whatever the type of loan, in most countries banks are the most significant lenders 
(Boleat 2003). Therefore, it is important to consider research on banks and banking in 
Egypt. 
 According to research, Egypt’s banks only serve 10% of its residents, with the 
rest of the population being too poor to bank. This creates a need for private sector 
banks to offer financing solutions to low-income groups. A number of banks are 
already attempting to increase their penetration of the small and medium enterprise 
market. Microfinance solutions remain minimal, even though this segment of the 
population is not the most profitable it is by far the largest (The Banker 2008).  
 Credit rating agency Standard & Poor’s ranks Egypt’s banking sector as 
relatively risky, with a score of 8/10 and “10” being riskiest. This rating is at North 
African levels, but higher than risk ratings of banks in the Gulf (The Banker 2008). 
Not all research is consistent, though. One year later (2009) The Banker published 
results citing at the average loan to deposit ratio of Egyptian banks is 54%, creating a 
“goldmine of liquidity.” However, the same research claims that the biggest threat 
facing Egypt’s banks is asset quality (Corbett, 2009). The Banker confirmed this 
claim with another, in 2003, banking law introduced stricter rules to improve asset 
quality, and also to increase minimum capital requirements and force consolidation 
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(The Banker 2008). In other published research, The Banker examines the reason 
Egyptian banks survived the 2009 global economic downturn. It claims this survival 
was due to the unsophisticated nature of the system, as well as it not being mature 
enough to be exposed to the structured assets that were behind the fall of banks in 
more developed countries. For example, the non-existence of a mortgage market 
saved them from a collapse in housing market prices, as international exposure is 
limited. Also, retail assets, including home loans and credit cards, still only make up 
about 10% of total assets in Egypt’s banking sector (Corbett, 2009). 
 A look at the condition of loans in banks validates research. For example, The 
Banker claims that non-performing loans, which are loans that are at default or at risk 
of being at default, range between 20-25% in banks. Boleat’s research on lenders also 
makes two important points. One, the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) is a key variable in 
assessing the risk of a loan and the likeliness of default. Loans with LTV of 85-90% 
have expected loss ratio twice as high as loans with an LTV of 75-80% and eight 
times as high as loans with an LTV of 60-65% (Boleat 2003). In explanation, the 
higher the LTV ratio, the more likeliness of default. Second, banks matching assets 
and liabilities carry no interest rate risk. For example, a bank that makes all loans at 
variable rates and funds those loans through deposits also at variable rates, or makes 
twenty-year loans that are financed by twenty-year bonds (Boleat 2003).  
 By 2006, more commercial banks were taking an interest in home purchase 
lending; this was partly due to their need for new loan products to absorb their 
liquidity (Struyk 2007). Boleat agrees and adds that a striving house finance 
mechanism would deepen and broaden the Egyptian financial system in general. This 
would be through people who would not otherwise use formal financial institutions to 
do so if it will help improve their housing conditions (Boleat 2003). 
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 The Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) has a restriction on real estate related 
credits to 5% of a bank’s loan portfolio, a limitation that the CBE has indicated could 
be adjusted if it becomes an impediment to loan growth (Struyk and Brown 2006). 
Research by Bahaa Eldin, Mohieldin, and Nasr also discuses that limitation. They 
claim that when the 5% was imposed, most banks were already above that ceiling; as 
this restriction applies to loans to homebuyers, developers and commercial premises 
and hotels. Individual loans to buy homes and developer loans to build projects are 
treated equally. In more developed countries, like the United Kingdom for example, 
the two types of transactions are separate and even managed by different departments 
in the banks and financial institutions. A key reason for this separation is that home 
buyers should be secured by the buyer’s income and by the property in question but a 
loan to a developer has not such security and so should carry a higher interest rate 
(Bahaa Eldin, Mohieldin, and Nasr (2004). Boleat also provides a comparison to other 
countries, citing that in few countries do regulations set a maximum proportion of a 
bank’s balance sheet that should be in the form of mortgage loans (Boleat 2003). 
However, The Banker interviews Henri Guillemin, managing director of Credit 
Agricole in Egypt, who states, “[the government] understands the banking industry 
very well. We can speak to then, they know what we do and they are on the same 
wavelength. What we are missing is more coherent regulation” (Corbett, 2009). 
 The Banker states in other research that Egyptian banks have no exposure to 
subprime mortgages, which are a type of mortgages made out to borrowers with lower 
credit rating and those who have higher risk of defaulting. Lenders charge a higher 
interest rate to compensate the higher risk. Some gulf countries like the UAE and 
Kuwait have similar mortgage practices through emergency lending facilities to help 
ease credit liquidity (The Banker 2008).  
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G. Government regulation 
 Government regulation of mortgages is discussed within most research on 
mortgage, but some researchers address it specifically. Erbas and Nothaft cite that the 
lack of well-defined procedures for enforcing claims, recurring defaults, and difficulty 
in evicting former owners of foreclosed property are among the reasons that hinder 
further development of housing finance (Erbas and Nothaft 2005). Boleat is another 
researcher that specifically addresses regulation. He defines the context within which 
mortgage finance operates: there is a need for financial stability- he explains that long 
term loans are not possible when inflation and interest rates are high and volatile and 
there must also be general economic stability and a trust in the financial institutions. 
Market players must also be confident that they are not at risk of changing policies 
and regulations (Boleat 2003). Boleat cites that with restrictive borrowing policies, 
households tend to consume more and save less as the purchase of a home locks up 
their capital, which would otherwise be a savings tools (Boleat 2003). 
 Aside from the context in which mortgages should operate, he also discusses 
the general approach to what regulation should be like, or in other words, public 
policy on financial regulation. Regulation should ensure the financial soundness of 
lending institutions, protect the public and develop the market. These objectives may 
conflict in the short term, but in the long term, the public is protected from losing 
savings and the financial market can develop only if the institutions are sound. Boleat 
states that the ideal state of borrowing would be at an interest rate of three to four 
percent above the cost of funds, but in most emerging markets the actual spread is 
five to eight percent and in developed markets it is under two percent. An effective 
regulatory system decreases that spread and thus allows for expansion in the mortgage 
market (Boleat 2003).  
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Regulators should take certain factors into account when looking at the overall 
risk structure of a lender’s loan portfolio. There should be arrangements for ensuring 
proper valuation of mortgages properties. Loan to income rations and a track record 
of borrowers also must be taken into account. Third, regulators should look at the 
concentration of risk by type of borrower, type of property or location of property. 
Finally, there should be a form of guarantee, such as mortgage insurance, that 
compensate lenders in case of default, foreclosure, and the property being sold at a 
loss (Boleat 2003).  
Boleat then discusses practices that regulators should limit or prevent. First, 
lenders should not use variable rate deposits to finance long term fixed rate loans. If 
there is a significant rise in short term rates, their losses will also be significant. 
Second, if regulators wish to limit mortgage lending for practical reasons, they should 
do so by setting capital requirements rather than balance sheet controls. When balance 
sheet controls are used, banks can continue to make loans for house purchases but 
without having any real mortgage security, unlike with setting capital requirements 
(Boleat 2003). 
Further from a policy perspective, mortgage markets have a positive impact on 
savings. Erbas and Nothaft address the reasons why. First, savings from mortgages 
have high returns and lead to rapid urbanization. Also, mortgages secure collateral 
against market fluctuations. Housing prices are less volatile than other assets, and thus 
are an attractive savings channel. Fourth, mortgages allow for increased labor 
mobility and increased employment potential. Finally, general subsidies are better 
targeted though housing and mortgage markets (Erbas and Nothaft 2005).  
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H. Credit risk bureaus 
 Although lightly addressed in available research, credit risk bureaus are an 
important aspect of the mortgage market. One set of researchers, Carleton, Everhart, 
and Heybey, address it even though none of their claims are positive. They claim that 
there are no credit risk bureaus (based on research conducted in 2006) but that there is 
one currently in development by a group of banks and financial institutions. They also 
claim that the informal sector, which is quite large in Egypt, has little incentive to 
report to the tax authority, and so might not be accounted for by credit agencies 
anyway. Lenders often assume the lower-income people have poor credit risk and 
they are denied loans. This assumption does not always hold true and creditworthy 
borrowers are often denied funding. The opposite is true for higher income groups, 
which are granted loans. Consequently, a housing shortage remains where housing 
finance is most needed (Carleton, P., Everhart, S., & Heybey, B. 2006).  
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IV. Methodology  
 
 Primary research was conducted through personal interviews with mortgage 
experts and market players, composed of regulators and prominent lenders. 
Qualitative research was chosen for several reasons. First, it is important to this topic 
that experts are given the capacity to discuss their views freely, without the limit of 
written questions. Also, interviews are more personal, one on one, and thus work to 
help the interviewee share more than they would through less personal methods. 
Third, there is a time factor involved. When seeking information from experts, in this 
case, for example, bank officials, their time is valuable and limited. More would be 
willing to spend that time with a real person than with a piece of paper. Interviews 
provide insight on the issue now; and this is important since with housing and 
mortgage markets, rates change constantly and what might have been published and 
true last year may not be so this year. Last but very importantly, personal, qualitative 
methods that take an interest in the source (interviewee/case study subject) is likely to 
extract real information. The interaction alone provides additional information 
through noticeable attitudes that can best be expressed and observed in person. 
This research relies on several strategic interviews, separated into interviews with 
regulating institutions, interviews with lenders, and interviews with real-estate 
developers. Research participants are outlined and detailed as follows: 
A. Institutional players: interviewees 
 Extensive face-to-face interviews were conducted with senior representatives of 
many of the main institutions involved in the mortgage market in both the private and 
public sectors. This section briefly describes the institutions interviewed. The 
information presented was obtained during the interviews or from the organizations' 
websites. 
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1. Regulators  
• The Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) is an autonomous public legal body that is 
responsible for, among many objectives, realizing price stability and the 
banking sector soundness, setting and implementing the country’s monetary 
policy, setting and implementing banking policies, managing liquidity in the 
economy, and supervising the units of the banking sectors 
• The Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA) is the result of a 2009 
merger between agencies that supervised and regulated non-banking financial 
markets; specifically: the Capital Market, the Exchange, all activities related 
to insurance services, mortgage finance, financial leasing, factoring and 
securitization. In relation to mortgage finance, EFSA came to replace the 
Mortgage Finance Authority. EFSA’s training arm is the Institute of Financial 
Services, which offers mortgage training for EFSA employees as employees 
of the mortgage market.  
• The Egyptian Banking Institute (EBI) is the training arm of the CBE. Its 
clients are the banking and financial sectors. One of its important roles is the 
transfer of CBE regulations, new topics, and initiatives through seminars and 
conferences. EBI’s areas of work are composed of Bank and Finance 
(including mortgage finance), SME Unit, IT Training, Management (soft 
skills), and Corporate Governance. Its aim is to promote access to finance to 
those who need it. One way to do so is to begin with making people more 
bankable. EBI offers courses to employees of its forty member banks. Courses 
are also open to the public, which members have to pay for themselves. Their 
employer pays for bank employees.  
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2. Lenders  
 
• Tamweel is the financial arm of Orascom Hotels and Development (OHD), one 
of the largest real estate developers in Egypt, responsible for projects such as 
El Gouna and Haram City. Tamweel consider themselves the current best 
performing mortgage company in Egypt. It was established in 2007, becoming 
the third specialized mortgage company established under Law No. 148 for 
mortgage lending.  
• Ahli United Finance is a subsidiary of the Bahraini owned Ahli United Bank 
and acts as the bank’s mortgage lending arm. Ahli United Finance has an 
approved list of developers, to whose clients only can AUBE lend.  
• Tayseer is a specialized mortgage finance company, which is also the financial 
arm of Talaat Mostafa Group, one of the largest real estate developers in 
Egypt.  
• Nationale Société Générale Bank (NSGB) is one of the prominent banks in 
Egypt and in 2008 it launched its mortgage finance program under the name 
Aqarat. Aqarat has since been active in the mortgage market.  
• Alexbank was established in 1957 and is now owned by the Italian Intesa 
Sanpaolo Group. Alexbank began its mortgage program in 2005.  
• Taamir was the first specialized mortgage company formed under Law 148. It is 
owned by a consortium of public organizations, including the Ministry of 
Housing, the Housing and Development Bank, Misr Insurance, National 
Investment Bank, and Misr Life Insurance. Taamir is one of the very few 
companies that have almost reached their maximum licensed capital of LE500 
million, standing now at LE425 million. It also has the largest market share of 
all lenders, including banks, with over 22,000 clients. Of the current 
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outstanding loans, about eighty-five percent are out to low-income borrowers, 
also setting Taamir apart from other mortgage companies. Taamir is the only 
mortgage lender that finances construction, providing it is being done by the 
end user and not by a developer. It also offers full-range financing, including 
housing, refurbishment, and mortgages for trade and administrative facilities.  
• The National Bank of Abu Dhabi (NBAD) began operations in the Egyptian 
mortgage market in 2006 as an attempt to diversify its products and meet the 
needs of its clients.  
• The Commercial International Bank (CIB), one of the most prominent banks 
operating in Egypt, started mortgage finance in 2005 under the department of 
Residential Property Finance. The department has since evolved in many 
ways, including leadership, nevertheless CIB remains a mortgage lender.  
• The Egyptian Mortgage Refinance Company (EMRC) is the only specialized 
mortgage refinancer in Egypt. EMRC is owned by a consortium of public 
institutions and banks, including: the Central Bank of Egypt, National Bank of 
Egypt, Mortgage Finance Guarantee and Subsidy Fund, Arab Bank, HSBC, 
Societe Arabe Internationale de Banque, BNP Paribas, Commercial 
International Bank, Faisal Islamic Bank, Banque Misr, Al Watany Bank of 
Egypt, Taamir Mortgage Finance, Misr Iran Bank, Egyptian Gulf Bank, 
Housing and Development Bank, Ahli United Bank, Egypt Arab Land Bank, 
Tamweel Mortgage Finance Company, International Finance Corporation, 
United Bank. EMRC has not yet borrowed from banks in Egypt to increase its 
capital, but has borrowed from The World Bank at an interest rate of 9.3% and 
lends at a rate between 10.25% to 12.5%.  
• The Egyptian Housing Finance Company (EHFC) was established in 2004 as a 
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vehicle to bring in more business to the booming real estate market at the time 
of the initiation of Law 148, 2001. It was established through strong 
shareholders with massive experience in development, real estate, finance and 
mortgage. EHFC is now one-hundred percent owned by Crédit Agricole 
Egypt. It was formerly owned by the Housing and Development Bank along 
with several other finance corporations, including the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) and the Indian Housing Finance Development Corporation 
(HDFC). HDFC was of strong significance in the start up of EHFC as it is 
extremely well-versed in mortgage and provided EHFC with technical 
assistance.  
3. Developers 
Talaat Mostafa Group (TMG) is one of the oldest and most prominent large-scale real 
estate developers in the Egyptian market. The group is responsible for mega projects 
such as El Rehab City, Al Rabwa, and Madinaty.  
 
 In order to enable this research to extract information more openly, interviews 
were mostly open discussions of different topics important to research. The purpose 
of carrying them out in the looser form of discussion was to not limit answers and 
give room to the interviewees to add their own points, which might not have been 
asked about and therefore add to research results. In other words, the more the 
interviewees we given the change to talk, the more addition to research results.  
 
 An alternate approach to research is the quantitative one, but it not well suited 
for the purpose of this research. Quantitative research separates theory and data, and 
in mortgages, theories are not set it stone, and procedures can be changed according 
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to the market environment. Also, quantitative research can be independent of context, 
while for this research context and situational data are key to address how mortgages 
are performing and why. Quantitative data is further unsuitable due to reliance on 
many cases and/or subjects, while this research addresses very specific cases and 
subjects (buyers, sellers and regulators of mortgage) that are not found in abundance 
and publicized in the Egyptian market. More importantly, quantitative research 
focuses on variables rather than on interactive processes and events that lead to 
certain outcomes (as with qualitative research), which is again the case with an 
emerging mortgage market (Neuman 2006). 
B. Research limitations 
 For the purpose of research, three types of institutions were interviewed: 
regulators, lenders, and one of Egypt’s largest real estate developers.  
Confidentiality was a primary limitation to the lenders’ interviews. Banking 
information is sensitive and it was sometimes difficult for bankers to give insight 
while still keeping clients’ and the bank’s privacy. Therefore, some findings remain 
anonymous or are not traced back to a specific institution, as per the request of some 
interviewees on specific pieces of information.  
 Limitations to this research were also in access to market players. Of the three 
types of market players sought for interviewing (regulators, lenders, and real estate 
developers) mortgage lenders were most eager to participate. Next came regulators, 
who were willing to participate but did not seem as keen as lenders. Real estate 
developers were the most difficult to persuade to participate. As a result, only one real 
estate developer is cited. Others contacted were not interested in mortgage research 
and so would not spare the time to participate. While this does not have altering 
effects on research findings, it would have been beneficial to assess the degree of 
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harmony of different developers’ opinions of the mortgage market. Clear barriers and 
recommendations to mortgage finance in Egypt were found through harmony in 
different lenders’ statements, only because so many were interviewed so there was a 
chance for comparison. While the one real estate developer is certainly among the 
largest in Egypt, there were none else to compare. 
 Some types of market players in the mortgage market were left out of research, 
including mortgage borrowers and some legal entities, such as notaries and involved 
ministries. Notaries are an integral part of the mortgage process because of the 
amount of legal documentation within that process. Ministries involved in the 
mortgage, especially the Ministry of Housing and Development, are also important 
regulators of the market due to their influence over the housing supply. Mortgage is a 
massive subject and its sub-topics can be never ending, especially with so many ties 
to the local and global financial markets.  
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V. Research Findings 
A. Introduction  
 There are three types of mortgage finance lenders in Egypt: specialized 
mortgage companies, specialized banks (such as the Housing and Development 
Bank), and trade banks (such as Commercial International Bank - CIB). Specialized 
mortgage companies are regulated by the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority 
(EFSA) and both types of banks are regulated by the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE). 
(Bank officer) As banks ventured into mortgages, problems appeared and had to be 
addressed. Specific problems and lenders’ reactions and recommendations are 
discussed in further sections. Since the passing of Law 148 of 2001 on mortgages, its 
implementation and following amendments, 2004 and 2008, banks have been 
changing credit policy to be tailored to obstacles in mortgage loans. (Bank officer).  
 Banks’ attention to mortgages gradually increased after the implementation of 
the mortgage law. They started to respond the real estate market boom by 2005, 
labeling the mortgage market as an “unexplored diamond” (Bank officer). Among the 
reasons mortgages are attractive to banks is because they make the client stay with the 
bank, or the lender, for at least ten to fifteen years. Also, the introduction of 
mortgages to the banking sector came following an important socio-economic shift 
occurring over the past ten to fifteen years. As more banks and multinational 
corporations infiltrated the employment market, more employees were exposed to a 
foreign work culture. “BMW drivers used to be self-employed, but that is not the case 
anymore.” People started making more money, which lead to higher aspirations in a 
domino effect (Mortgage company officer). This is of positive use to the mortgage 
market because as aspirations grew, so did demand for more expensive homes, which 
could be attained through mortgage finance.  
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 Experts in the field have described mortgage lending as, “more important than 
the gas can and the loaf of bread.” Hamed Salama, the Sector Head of Internal Audit 
& Compliance (Mortgage company officer). Without a proper home to live in, there is 
no place for the can of gas nor the loaf of bread. 
B. Regulations 
 Lending related to housing and construction is divided into real estate, which is 
lending for corporations, and mortgage, which is lending to individuals. By law, the 
CBE regulates all banks; this includes public sector banks, private banks, and 
branches of foreign banks (Regulatory agency officer). While specialized mortgage 
companies are regulated by EFSA, there is also indirect regulation from the CBE. 
According to a senior officer at EHFC, since companies are borrowers from banks, so 
CBE regulations affect bank policies, which consequently affect borrower mortgage 
companies (Mortgage company officer). 
 There are two regulations issued by the CBE concerning mortgage lending. 
First, there is a five-percent ceiling of the banks’ loan portfolio on real estate lending. 
Second, provision for real estate lending is at fifty-percent of the loan value, as 
opposed to twenty-five percent in other sectors (Regulatory agency officer). 
 Most banks would like to see a ceiling higher than the CBE’s five-percent for 
real estate lending. The ceiling is there due to the risk of long-term loans. As a 
solution, some banks have developed specialized mortgage companies that lend out of 
their own capital or through loans from other lending institutions (Regulatory agency 
officer). Other banks overcome the regulation through securitization (Bank officer). 
Even some specialized mortgage companies agree that the 5% CBE regulation is 
unrealistic. One particular company is Tamweel, the mortgage arm of Orascom Hotels 
and Development, which consider themselves the current best performing mortgage 
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company in Egypt. It was established in 2007, becoming the third specialized 
mortgage company established under Law No. 148 for mortgage lending (Mortgage 
company officer). 
 As for the second regulation, the CBE compels banks to keep a provision of 
50% of mortgage loans. The concept of provision is to decrease risk of non-
performing loans or default. For example, if a bank lends a mortgage for LE100 
million, it would have to set aside LE50 million. This amount is deducted from the 
bank’s capital and returned when the borrower completes the mortgage installments. 
Provision is only for the bank’s books, it is an internal process but is reported to the 
CBE (Regulatory agency officer). However, provision is not at a fixed rate, the 
provision amount increases as borrowers’ payments are late. General provision, as 
regulated by the CBE, rises to twenty-percent after one month delay in payment, to 
fifty-percent after two months delay, and to one-hundred-percent of the loan amount 
by the third month of delay in payment (Bank officer). 
 Another guiding principal by the CBE is the debt burden ratio (DBR), which is 
the percentage of income that can be debt. The average DBR for which banks give 
loans is thirty-five percent (Regulatory agency officer). For example, if a borrower 
makes LE10,000 a month, and pays installments for a car loan and a personal loan for 
a combined LE2000, and the thirty-five percent DBR is applied, then the borrower 
has a maximum left over of LE1500 to take a mortgage, or to take on another type of 
banking debt. Some banks, such as the National Bank of Abu Dhabi,  are above that 
average implementing a DBR of sixty-percent (Bank officer). 
 A change to the law has to come through Parliament, but changes in regulations 
can come through Ministerial Decrees (Mortgage company officer) and changes to the 
mortgage law have been specific to regulations. The mortgage law was first amended 
  41 
in 2004 to create more flexibility within the market; instead of mortgage only 
allowing mortgages for registered units, units that were eligible for registration could 
also be mortgaged. In 2008, there was another amendment to mortgage regulations. 
Not only did the mortgage unit have to be registered or eligible for registration, it also 
had to have completed utilities, specifically water and electricity. This regulation was 
only for banks. Companies could still finance units under construction but the amount 
of finance had to be equal in ratio to the percentage of construction completed, and 
only for a specific amount of their portfolio, approximately thirty percent. (Bank 
officer)  
 With the global financial crisis, a problem started to appear with the Emirati 
real-estate developers Damac. The CBE responded by setting additional regulations 
that banks do not finance mortgages in compounds that are not completely finished, 
including construction of all phases as well as water and electricity lines (Bank 
officer). 
C. The mortgage market 
1. Current market data 
 According to the latest EFSA quarterly report, the current volume of the 
mortgage market stands at approximately LE5.4 billion, divided almost equally 
between banks and specialized mortgage companies, as shown in Table A. Table B 
shows that over sixty-six percent of mortgage lending is made to low-income clients, 
with a monthly income of LE1,750 or less. While the largest market base is low-
income groups, Table C shows that the highest value of mortgage loans is made out to 
high-income groups. While the percentage of low-income lending is significant, the 
amount of overall lending- if considered accurate- is not. This is especially true when 
the total number of mortgages, by number of investors, or mortgage borrowers, up to 
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September 2011 (24,876 as per data in the Table A below) is compared to estimate 
demand for 260,000 units needed annually to accommodate population growth 
(Carleton, P. Everhart, S. & Heybey, B. 2006).  
Table A: 
Important Details and Indicators 
Indicator Cumulative – 
September 2010 
Cumulative – 
September 2011 
Growth (%) 
Total mortgage lending by mortgage 
companies (in millions, EGP) 
1961 2808.9 43.2% 
Total outstanding debt by investors to 
mortgage companies (in millions, EGP) 
1381 1889 36.8% 
Total mortgage lending by banks (in 
millions, EGP) 
2160 2600 20.4% 
Total number of borrowers 16298 24876 52.6% 
Average loan to value ratio (LTV) % 48.1% 45.6% 5.2% 
Average Interest Rate (%) 12.5% 12.3% -1.5% 
Average loan amount (in thousands, 
EGP) 
120.4 112.9 -6.2% 
Average repayment duration (year) 16.1 16.4 1.9% 
Average monthly installment (EGP) 2983 2737 -8.2% 
*Source: Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority Quarterly Report July-September 
2011. www.efsa.gov.eg 
 
Table B: 
Borrowers by monthly income 
Monthly 
Income (EGP) 
Cumulative- September 2010 Cumulative- September 2011 Percentage 
change Number Share Number Share 
Up to 1750 10875 66.7% 17118 68.8% 57.4% 
1751-2500 1011 6.2% 1321 5.3% 30.7% 
2501-5000 1321 8.1% 1781 7.2% 34.8% 
5001-10000 604 3.7% 858 3.4% 42.1% 
10001-20000 709 4.4% 1064 4.3% 50.1% 
20001-100000 1250 7.7% 1924 7.7% 53.9% 
More than 
100000 
528 3.2% 810 3.3% 53.4% 
total 16298 100% 24876 100% 52.6% 
*Source: Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority Quarterly Report July-September 
2011. www.efsa.gov.eg 
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Table C: 
 
Volume of mortgage lending by monthly income of borrowers 
Monthly Income 
(EGP) 
Cumulative- September 
2010 
Cumulative- September 
2011 
Percentage 
change 
Amount 
(million 
EGP) 
Share Amount 
(million 
EGP) 
Share 
Up to 1750 365 18.6% 555.9 19.8% 52.3% 
1751-2500 57 2.9% 73.4 2.6% 28.8% 
2501-5000 102 5.2% 134.1 4.8% 31.5% 
5001-10000 84 4.3% 102 3.6 21.4% 
10001-20000 142 7.2% 175.3 6.3% 23.5% 
20001-100000 543 27.7% 804.3 28.6% 48.1% 
More than 100000 668 34.1% 963.9 34.3% 44.3% 
total 1961 100% 2808.9 100% 43.2% 
*Source: Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority Quarterly Report July-September 
2011. www.efsa.gov.eg  
 
The two tables above provide data on mortgage lending by income level. The 
majority of mortgage borrowers, or investors, are from low-income groups (Table B) 
while the bulk of mortgage loans is made to those making over 100,000 EGP 
monthly, closely followed by the group making between 20,000-100,000 EGP 
monthly. This comparison revisits the issue of the bulk of mortgage lending not going 
to those groups who may need it most. 
2. Some market practices 
 Most lending is based on a decreasing interest; meaning interest is calculated 
according to the remaining repayment amount. Banks in Egypt do not standardize the 
payment through amortization, as is the case in many other markets. Therefore, as the 
debt is being paid off, interest is charged on a progressively smaller amount. So while 
the given interest rate may seem high, it decreases over the years of loan repayment. 
For example, a decreasing rate of fourteen-percent comes to about nine-percent over 
the repayment term of fifteen years. 
 Many mortgage companies practice transfer of mortgage portfolios. This is a 
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process by which a mortgage company buys off all the outstanding installments in a 
developer’s portfolio. The first lender’s (the developer's) clients become the clients of 
the mortgage company, and are notified through a legal notification of transfer 
(Mortgage company officer). The buyer pays the same installments but to the new 
mortgage lender. The mortgage lender benefits off the interest rate and the developer 
benefits by receiving full and final payments from the portfolio buyer rather than 
payment through a trickle of buyer installments. Refinancing through the Egyptian 
Mortgage Refinance Company (EMRC) is possible but not mandatory. Lenders can 
go for partial equity and partial refinancing to increase funds, or bank loans.  
(Mortgage company officer). Aside from banks, EMRC is the only official mortgage 
refinancer in Egypt. 
 Most mortgage lenders, whether specialized mortgage companies or banks, 
require borrowers to submit post-dated checks with the repayment amounts and 
according to the agreed upon repayment plan. On the one hand, mortgage lenders are 
borrowers from banks, so the checks collected from clients serve as the company’s 
borrowing collateral and mode of payment (Mortgage company officer). On the other 
hand, the checks are not only used as a repayment method, but also as a pressure tool. 
In case of default, foreclosure cases are a different route in court than default in 
checks, which are considered misdemeanor cases. For lower income borrowers who 
do not have the capacity to write checks, lenders may take trust receipts (Mortgage 
company officer). The idea of going to court scares lower income borrowers, who 
realize the risk of jail and seizure of assets that may result from passing non-
performing checks or trust receipts. 
 In the case of the lender reclaiming the unit in question in case of borrower 
default, the unit is either sold through an auction or added to the lender’s assets. To 
  45 
avoid the process of foreclosure, which is discussed in later sections, some clients 
may ask for special payment schemes, such as rescheduling payments to prevent 
default. This is beneficial for the lenders as they are still making money off 
repayments, just under a different scheme (Mortgage company officer). 
3. Common issues 
a. Security 
 Although the mortgage law and its regulations are meant to protect all three 
sides in a mortgage agreement (the buyer, the seller, and the lender), the market has 
demonstrated extra measures of guarantee.  For example, all lenders interviewed 
provide mandatory life insurance with mortgage loans, in case of death or permanent 
disability of the borrower, to ensure payment continues. The mortgage law specifies 
that the borrower cannot be above sixty-five years of age at the end of tenor 
(Mortgage company officer). When security measures for each side are compared, 
lenders claim that a mortgage borrower is more secured than through developer 
installments or direct purchase because they are backed by banks’ legal departments. 
Also, some lenders practice what is called bridging collateral, meaning they do not 
take the guarantee of the mortgaged unit, but any other unit or capital owned by the 
borrower (Bank officer) 
 In case of late repayments, specifically, three months delay, the lender has the 
right to take the borrower to court after three consecutive months. During the first two 
months of default, the lender pressures the borrower with calls, warning letters and 
site visits. If a case is to make it to court, it happens through a mortgage broker, who 
is registered with EFSA, and who is paid in percentage of the loan in question, 
ranging from half a percent to two and half percent (Mortgage company officer). 
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b. Credit rating 
 Methods of credit evaluation are separated into the Commercial Credit Registry 
for corporations and the I-Score for individuals (Regulatory agency officer). Before 
the I-Score, lenders relied on CBE reports to assess borrower credit rating, but CBE 
reports did not provide detailed history. Borrowers with poor credit rating are placed 
on the CBE’s ‘negative list’ and lenders are prohibited from lending to those on the 
negative list (Regulatory agency officer).  “The credit bureau is the bible,” but further 
credit evaluation is carried out even after the credit bureau green light (Bank officer). 
Credit worthiness assessment for borrowers who are employees is usually calculated 
through required documents, such as a human resources letter and bank statement. 
When there is a lack or difficulty in obtaining such documentation, other forms of 
credit worthiness assessment may include a ‘field questioning’, which is the lender 
seeking information about the potential borrower around their residence and place of 
work (Regulatory agency officer). 
 The CBE takes a risk-based approach. Everything is translated to risk and the 
interest rate is derived from the level of risk. “Everything is rated by the CBE in some 
way. For example, an individual working for a multinational corporation is rated 
higher than another working for a no-name company.” Ratings are also determined by 
income, years of work, and residence. Residence is an especially unique rating 
because some areas are labeled as ‘negative areas’ to denote lower income areas. In 
these areas, there are, for example, no ATMs for higher-end banks but only for some 
public banks (Regulatory agency officer). 
c. Low income housing finance 
 Very few lenders provide mortgages for low-income housing. The majority 
finance higher income groups. Low-income mortgages can be co-financed with the 
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Mortgage Finance Guarantee and Subsidy Fund, which is the government arm to 
promote and assist in mortgage finance (Mortgage company officer). By law, 
installments for low-income borrowers cannot be more than twenty-five percent of 
their income. Low-income is defined as a maximum monthly income of LE1750 for 
singles and LE2500 for families (Mortgage company officer). 
 One specific example of dedicated mortgage lending to lower-income groups is 
that practiced by Tamweel. As the lending arm of OHD, Tamweel’s contribution to 
low income housing finance is embodied in Haram City and Haram Life. Haram City 
and Haram Life are low-income housing facilities in Giza, initiated by Eng. Samih 
Sawiras of Orascom Hotels and Development. 
 Haram City and Haram Life are composed of 50,000 unites, of which 10,000 
have been completed. Tamweel finances over half of the completed units. At the start 
of the project, units average sixty-square meters in size at an average price tag of 
LE60,000 to LE80,000 (Mortgage company officer). 
d. Mortgage finance and developer installment plans 
 Competition to mortgage lending as a practice is found in developer installment 
payment plans. To the consumer, both developer installments and mortgage finance 
are a more supportable form of payment than upfront full payment for a real estate 
unit, but the two options have different paths. There are different benefits, detractions 
and practices to each path. One point that might make clients favor developers is that 
developers do not rate clients like mortgage lenders do, they “sell him [the client] his 
dream with a pen and a check book” (Mortgage company officer). When it comes to 
repayment default, there are more ways to pressure a client in default with developer 
installments than with mortgage repayments. For example a developer can cut off 
water and electricity to a specific unit, but a mortgage lender has no such control 
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(Real-estate developer officer). 
 A senior official at EHFC and one of the founders of the mortgage market in 
Egypt believes that developers have several gains on housing finance that mortgage 
programs do not. Developers offer discounts on cash payments, and the buyer does 
not realize that this discount is the same as what a mortgage interest rate would have 
been. Furthermore, there is more amicability between the client and the developer 
than between the client and the mortgage lender. Developers are in favor of mortgage 
finance only when their sales are low. But as long as their market is booming, “they 
are having their cake and eating it too” (Mortgage company officer). The EHFC 
official further claims that developers need to be regulated to work within certain 
parameters in order to safeguard the end user. Controlled off-plan sales were what 
saved the Egyptian real estate market from the 2009 financial crisis (Mortgage 
company officer). One lender argues that if there is an efficient mortgage finance 
program, no one will ever knock the door of developer installments; but there is a 
need for proper guidance and proper education (Bank officer). 
e. Availability of data 
 The Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA) website was updated 
recently, during the first quarter of 2012, to reflect the merger of the various 
supervisory authorities and publish data (Regulatory agency officer). It now displays 
detailed data of the mortgage market in Egypt, including volume, division by income 
level, geographic area, and by type of lender all in transparent quarterly reports. When 
questioned about availability of data, one mortgage lender, Tamweel, claimed that in 
the early years of mortgage in Egypt, specifically 2007, there were only two 
preceding mortgage companies (Taamir and Egyptian Housing Finance Company) so 
data might have not been available, but nor was it needed (Mortgage company 
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officer). 
f. Islamic mortgage finance 
 According to credit rating agency Moody’s Investors Service, the global Islamic 
finance market has been growing about fifteen-percent every year for the years 
between 2005 and 2008. In 2008, the worldwide worth of the Islamic finance market 
was at $700 billion. Many renowned finance names, such as Citigroup, HSBC, and 
Deutsche Bank have affiliated themselves with Islamic finance groups. Islamic 
banking in the Gulf accounted for twenty-five percent of the global market share in 
2011, according to the Ernst & Young World Islamic Banking Competitiveness report 
(Islamic Finance Middle East, 2011).  
 While Al Azhar Institute in Cairo does not prohibit conventional banking, there 
stricter interpretations of the religion that prohibit all forms of interest. Consequently, 
Islamic banks avoid interest by treating loans as leases and profit-sharing 
arrangements (Wiseman, 2008). There are several principles that determine whether a 
loan adheres to Islamic Shari’ah Law. First, the loan must not require the borrower to 
pay interest; the loan must demonstrate that the borrower and the lender equally share 
risks, with no pre-determined return to the lender; the loan must be of assistance to 
society in some way, even if helping in trade services and most commodities; and the 
loan must not allow room for uncertainty (Ring, 2003).  
 While Islamic finance is most in demand in Muslim countries, especially the 
Gulf, it is also in demand where Middle Eastern investors take their business. 
Therefore, Islamic finance options are available in the UK and the US. The demand 
for Islamic finance in non-Muslim parts of the world is demonstrated in the (then) 
giant Freddie Mac buying Shari’ah-compliant mortgages in 2001. In 2007, Freddie 
Mac had bought over $250 million in Islamic mortgages (Wiseman, 2008). 
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 In Islamic banking, the bank buys the property from the seller and rents it to the 
buyer. The buyer pays a sum each month, part rent and part installment towards 
ownership. This way, the three-party agreement and registration issues disappear. It is 
a simple process of one entity buying a piece of property from another and renting it 
to a third. The problem with this method is that as long as the buyer is repaying the 
bank, the unit is a bank asset that raises balance sheets. There is also the CBE 
regulation that banks cannot own assets except for activity, for example, to use as a 
bank branch. But even those problems have solutions; one is starting company, or a 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to do the lending on behalf of the bank and to own the 
assets (Bank officer). 
D. Problems and barriers 
 Interviews with mortgage professionals, including some of the most prominent 
founders of the market, heavily concentrated on problems and barriers associated with 
the mortgage market. This was the case not because interviews were guided by 
problem issues, but because interviewees had more to say on the subject than 
anything else. One former head of a major mortgage division claimed that the scope 
of problems in the mortgage market starts with registration and ends with 
repossession and is inclusive of everything in between (Bank officer). Another 
prominent professional claimed that there is not only a lack in information and 
transparency, but also a lack in vision (Mortgage company officer). While the two 
statements summarize the faults with the mortgage markets, detailed accounts of 
where the problems lay are discussed below, and followed by recommendations to 
better housing finance by the same professionals who pinpointed the barriers. 
1. Infrastructure: Documentation and Registration 
 Property registration is the single agreed upon barrier to mortgage finance 
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within the scope of this research. Registration is a significant issue to mortgage 
finance for two reasons. One, the mortgage law specifies that only units that are 
registered or eligible for registration can be financed. Secondly, only about ten 
percent of all real estate property in Egypt is registered. One lender claims that 
barriers to mortgage housing finance are related to infrastructure, especially the issue 
of registration. Sixty to seventy percent of the processing effort of mortgage lending 
is legal documentation. Ninety-percent of the urban real estate market remains 
unregistered despite the amendment of registration laws and regulations (Mortgage 
company officer). Registration is further important to mortgage finance as it is the 
gateway to collateral and guarantee for the mortgage (Regulatory agency officer). 
 Problems specific to registration can be summed up in the time its takes to 
register a unit, the complexity of the process, and the cost. The length of time it takes 
to process a mortgage is not due to the banks, rather on part of the regulators, 
especially the notaries. A major problem associated with time is that some documents 
expire during the mortgage process and must be reissued, which further complicates 
the process (Bank officer). 
 One mortgage lender claims that the problem with registration is not just in the 
paperwork, but people were not registering their property to avoid consequent and 
associated taxes and fees (Bank officer). Also, there is no incentive for developers to 
register their land and individual registration fees remain high. The announced flat 
rate of maximum LE2000 is not the reality. There are other associated fees, up to 
LE5000 in legal fees, not to mention what is still being paid under the table 
(Mortgage company officer). 
 Registration also becomes a major barrier to mortgage finance in areas outside 
of Cairo. For example, land in areas like Sharm el Sheikh could be attractive for 
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mortgages, especially for expatriates in retirement. However, it is not eligible for 
registration because it is not owned, rather occupied under a usufruct scheme for 
ninety-nine years. (Bank officer). So such areas, under Law 148, are not eligible for 
mortgage finance at all.  
2. Deposits, loans, and tenor mismatch 
 Another problem that was brought up in most interviews is the tenor mismatch 
between deposits and loans.  Lenders very much realize that there is a problem with 
mortgages in short-term deposits and long-term loans (Bank officer). Aside from 
investment projects, banks find funds from their depositors, who are not working on 
the same long-term plan of mortgages. With bank loans, ten years is considered long 
term but the mortgage market is different (Mortgage company officer). Another 
problem  associated with mortgage tenor is that since employment contracts are not 
fixed- most are for two years or some limited time duration- it becomes difficult to 
guarantee a mortgage for the long-term duration of repayment (Regulatory agency 
officer). 
3. Lack of information: mortgage concept and data 
 One of the problems associated with mortgage lending is that the concept of 
mortgage is not clear. Even to banks, the concept of mortgage is still very new and its 
process is not yet well known.(Bank officer). Even mortgage professionals do not 
always understand the product, and thus cannot sell it. A mortgage is a product that 
needs one-on-one communication (Mortgage company officer). 
 Not only is the concept not clear, but neither are its components. For example, 
interest rate as a concept is one of the barriers to more widespread mortgage finance. 
With interest, people think they are paying more unnecessarily. This is also similar to 
bank deposits, which clients think are profitable but that is not true because of 
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inflation. “It is in the Egyptian culture to want to profit without allowing others to 
profit, but it is, or is supposed to be, a mutual benefit relationship,” Ahmed Maamoun, 
Marketing Specialist at Tamweel Mortgage Finance (Mortgage company officer). 
 Some lenders claim that there is no awareness of mortgages, and no government 
promotion. The government started a program through Law 148, but it did not notify 
the public- the people who need it do not know about it (Mortgage company officer). 
The unfamiliarity with the mortgage law places the burden of its understanding 
mostly on legal professionals rather that direct sellers and users of mortgages. The 
fact that no one understands the process other than lawyers becomes problematic. 
There are no clear rules for registration and it remains complicated (Bank officer). 
Many lenders argue that there a simply not enough mortgage awareness, it is not a 
well-promoted product (Mortgage company officer). 
 Since notaries do not understand mortgages as well, there are constant requests 
for the buyer and seller to keep coming back for more information as needed by 
notaries, which becomes a hassle. Banks then become cornered, they have already 
made a loan while the paperwork is pending. This is partly due to the huge difference 
between what the written regulation and process are and reality. For example, one 
document needed to complete a mortgage is a statement of the first transaction on any 
piece of property. This, according to one bank, is not mentioned in Law 148. Also, 
there are many legal loopholes. For example, a client can take an additional mortgage 
from another bank while the paperwork for the first mortgage is still being processed 
(Bank officer). 
 Another aspect of information that is lacking in mortgage lending is proof of 
income. Some lenders argue that proof of income is difficult to determine accurately 
because Egyptians tend to avoid taxes, so a lot of activity goes unrecorded (Bank 
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officer). According to the one regulator, it is not possible to get a mortgage loan 
without proof of income (Regulatory agency officer). If accurate income cannot be 
determined, it sets in motion a domino trail of why a mortgage loan would not go 
through. This starts with the match between a buyer’s capability and the value of the 
prospective unit, and goes on to the tenor term and interest rate, all of which are 
pillars of a mortgage loan that heavily depend on an accurate income calculation. 
 When it comes to mortgage data and the volume of the market, there are more 
inaccuracies. EFSA numbers are not accurate as a result of duplication. For example, 
if a mortgage company makes out a loan that it refinances through a bank, that same 
loan is counted twice and thus increases the overall volume of mortgage lending 
(Mortgage company officer). This misguides lenders, buyers, sellers, and regulators 
of the market. Data duplication is a fact known to most mortgage lenders and some 
admit that mortgage data is, and will continue to be, a problem. Since mortgage data, 
both on the side of the unit- due to registration- and on the side of the borrower- due 
to proof of income- is inconsistent and inaccurate, rejection can be a result of the 
applicant or the unit (Mortgage company officer). 
4. Mortgage training and education caliber 
 When addressing mortgage finance in Egypt, mortgage professionals and their 
level of mortgage knowledge and education play an important role. Although there 
are evident leaders, found among the founders or early professionals of the market, 
they do not seem well supported by strong teams. In fact, some claim openly that 
there is a lack of good caliber mortgage professionals. There is a need for people who 
can sell it from a technical point of view and who can simplify it for the client 
(Mortgage company officer). 
 One prominent lender claims that not only are the lending professionals lacking 
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in strength, but also the regulators’ employees are often not strong enough to properly 
review the work of mortgage professionals. Mortgages are also difficult partly 
because education and training have been overcome by routine (Mortgage company 
officer). Some lenders claim that training courses have lost credibility with lenders, so 
sending employees can be a waste of time and money. Even courses offered by the 
EBI have been described as too theoretical (Bank officer). In fact, lenders claim that 
their employees can be better trained on the job than in a course. One mortgage 
professional provided a particularly interesting example. At a mortgage-specific 
course at Harvard, the mortgage employee was seated close to the Vice-President of 
The Philippines and the Vice-President of China. This scenario was given to 
exemplify how other countries consider mortgage education is of utmost importance, 
to send such high officials to training courses. In Egypt, a credit course is possible but 
not much specific to mortgage. Those who take such courses are only employees of 
one institution or another with not much decision making capabilities (Mortgage 
company officer).  
5. Cost of mortgage 
 Even though the cost of mortgage may be clear: the cost of the unit in 
installments plus interest over a certain duration, there are also many associated costs. 
Not only the interest rates are high, but there are many other associated fees such as 
administrative and notary fees, and these associated fees push mortgages further away 
from the reach of those who may need it most (Regulatory agency officer). 
 Some banks do realize that mortgages are intended for different levels of 
income, but claim that the current regulations are only applicable to high and middle 
income (Bank officer). One factor that drives up the cost of mortgage is that real 
estate prices are high, at a level that is unmatched by low income levels that have not 
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increased nearly as rapidly. Prices of components of real estate, such as steel and land, 
have increased, and are burdens on the end user (Mortgage company officer). The fact 
remains that the majority of Egyptian salaries are too low and so available units are 
too expensive for them (Bank officer). 
 Another major factor that raises the overall price of mortgage is the interest rate. 
Currently, most lenders provide mortgages at a decreasing interest rate of about 
fourteen percent, on average. While lenders know such rates are very high for 
mortgage, they are partly a result of the high levels of inflation in the country 
(Mortgage company officer). It is not only inflation associated with high interest rate, 
but also the high cost of money in Egypt. For example, treasury bills are priced at 
sixteen-percent, so the lending rate should be even higher than that since lenders 
make their profit from the interest rate spread. For example, if a bank receives 
deposits with nine-percent interest rate and gives loans with eleven-percent, it is 
profiting on the two-percent difference, after allowing for losses and processing costs. 
Thus the cost of money raises interest rates, not the banks (Mortgage company 
officer). 
 Aside from costs that are burdened on the end consumer, high costs also drive 
lenders away from promoting mortgages as much as they would. High provision that 
increases with payment delays is a burden on banks that increases as their loan 
portfolios grow (Bank officer). 
 Some lenders are more optimistic and adamant that the mortgage market can 
still grow. Others are not so optimistic. One lender claims that there is not much hope 
for mortgages as a retail product. It is the least selling retail product, versus credit 
cards and car loans, which are highly more profitable to the bank (El-Banna, 
Mohamed. Personal Communication. April 2, 2012). However, that claim is based on 
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mortgages as a retail product. There is a different setting and scenario for mortgage as 
a business line on its own, to be discussed in later sections.  
6. Foreclosure and courts 
 Lenders move to foreclosure procedures only after the borrower in default is 
unresponsive and unwilling to repay the remaining amount of a mortgage loan. It is 
not to the benefit of the lender to move to foreclosure and even to reclaim a unit, but 
lenders do so when they do not have another choice. Lenders are financial institutions, 
not real estate sellers and buyers. It is in their best interest that a borrower continues 
payments according to schedule (Mortgage company officer). 
 Foreclosure is problematic due to its long process, up to a year average, and 
associated costs. Some lenders claim that this is the fault of of the Ministry of Justice, 
which should support lenders not stand in their way when trying to foreclose on a 
property (Bank officer). Other lenders claim that the difficulty with foreclosure is 
embedded in the fact that, under Law 148, foreclosure is only theoretical. There have 
only been four or five foreclosure cases in the entire mortgage market since the law 
was implemented. Even judges are confused between the mortgage law and the older 
rent law (Mortgage company officer). 
 Other lenders agree that the process of foreclosure is a driving force away from 
mortgages, citing the following scenario of payment default Other than a ban of the 
sale of the unit in question, the bank really has no control over foreclosure. Court 
cases can take years. Also, if a borrower defaults then leaves the country, there is no 
way for the bank to find them. It is a complicated process that needs the approval of 
the prosecutor general to, for example, arrest someone at the airport; a process that 
involves the CBE along with the police. Again, it is a hassle that drives the bank 
further away from mortgage loans (Bank officer). Even though lenders collect post-
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dated checks worth the repayment amount, these checks are a pressure tool but no 
good as collateral. The lender does not want a legal case against the borrower, it is to 
the benefit of the lender for payments to continue; there is no gain by sending a 
borrower to prison because of unpaid debts, the debts remain unpaid (Bank officer). 
 Regulators are well aware that foreclosure is an obstacle in the mortgage law. 
One example of a foreclosure case is the famous Ahly Bank towers on the Nile 
Corniche. The bank foreclosed on the two buildings due to borrower default, and 
eventually turned them into the bank’s headquarters. However, the foreclosure 
process lasted about fifteen years (Regulatory agency officer). In foreign mortgage 
markets, the collateral is valid guarantee. Here, there is always the risk of difficult 
foreclosures as well as the risk of loss of income (Mortgage company officer). 
7. Mortgage culture 
 When discussing the problems associated with the mortgage market in Egypt, 
many lenders and regulators provided the same, simple statement that, “We are not a 
mortgage culture” (Regulatory agency officer). One particularly prominent lender was 
sure enough to make that their opening statement, even though the company is 
reportedly performing well. While lenders realize that mortgage is similar to rent, 
they claim that people do not understand that concept. Mortgage installments are 
close to rent, but it is the concept of debt that differs. Clients do not like to be 
indebted. However, the debt is actually to the clients‘ benefit. Instead of paying rent 
over the years and receiving nothing but occupation right, after years of paying 
mortgage installments not only would the clients have the right of occupation of the 
unit, but also ownership of the unit after mortgage payments are complete. While 
mortgage clients are actually making an investment by taking a mortgage, the concept 
of the client, or the borrower, as an investor is difficult to understand (Mortgage 
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company officer). 
 Some lenders further claim that there is a public, general assumption that 
mortgage loans are only another form of government control (Bank officer). The 
purchase with a contract over so many years and extra payments, as interest rates are 
perceived, may seem too controlling to many prospective clients. The mortgage 
culture issue spreads even further. Egyptians may be pro ownership, but usually are 
interested in units that do not match their income, for which neither direct purchase 
nor even mortgage would work. Not only are aspirations mismatched with 
affordability, there is a further mismatch between supply and demand, and that is a 
major constraint to the mortgage market. What is available is neither what is needed 
nor what is affordable (Mortgage company officer). 
8. No leader 
 The mortgage market in Egypt has been described as a “fatherless child” 
(Mortgage company officer). In other words, there is no patron for mortgages, be it a 
person or an organization or even a single model to follow. There are too many 
component ingredients to the mortgage industry. Properties are managed by the 
Ministry of Housing. Land has two components: the Ministry of Housing through the 
New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA) and governorate offices. There is also 
the component of Space Surveys, that define in detail the land and unit dimensions of 
a property, and are under the Ministry of Irrigation. Lending is managed through the 
financial sector, through banks and companies and regulated by the CBE and EFSA. 
Property and registration are on part of the Ministry of Justice. There is no national 
agency specific to the entire mortgage process, so the process as it is becomes a waste 
of time and effort (Mortgage company officer). All parties involved, including the 
Ministry of Housing and the Ministry of Justice, want to be the owner. Therefore, 
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they are consistently obstructing each others’ work. There is not collaboration and no 
synchronization. One lender suggests that it is only logical for mortgages to be under 
the Ministry of Housing, as the owner of all land as long as it is still unpaid for (Bank 
officer). 
 Also, there is more than one regulator. The mortgage market is controlled by the 
CBE and EFSA, as well as different bureaucracies within the government (Mortgage 
company officer). Several lenders voice the complaint that even the role of EFSA is 
not clear, whether it is a regulator or a promoter. Some believe that for now and at 
least until the mortgage market is more both active and stable, it should be a promoter 
(Mortgage company officer). 
9. No securitization 
 A major problem with the mortgage market, at least of lenders, is that the 
mortgage process stops at a critical stage, which is securitization. Securitization is the 
bundling and sales of mortgages to the secondary market. The mortgage market has 
been described as lacking components. Lenders worldwide benefit through 
securitization, when the lender becomes a middleman profiting off differences in 
interest rate (Real-estate developer officer).  
 The single specialized mortgage refinance company in Egypt agrees that the 
core of mortgage markets worldwide is the transfer of the loan from the lender to the 
refinancer to the secondary market. The case should be “book the business then get it 
out of your books” (Mortgage company officer). In Egypt, there is only one mortgage 
refinancer. In active mortgage markets, there are many more refinancers, including 
mortgage brokers. The role of the refinancer should be to gather mortgages from 
different originators, bundle and securitize them and release bonds for their value. 
Secondary markets are important because investors have the liquidity to keep the 
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mortgage market active, and their bonds are secured by the mortgages (Mortgage 
company officer). There is agreement between many lenders on the dire need to reach 
the state of securitization, but some claim that it will never happen as long as each 
institution is working in isolation of others (Mortgage company officer). 
10. Other problems 
  While institutions participating in this research shared the above problems and 
barriers of the mortgage market, there are many others issues that were only realized, 
or noted by fewer than the majority. Some of these additional issues are highlighted 
below.  
The mortgage market is centralized, through branches of mortgage companies, in 
Cairo, with no access from other governorates. Only one or two mortgages lenders 
have branches in Alexandria (Mortgage company officer). 
  Islamic banking is now very much in demand. This affects the ordinary 
mortgage market differently from other countries, where people do not tend to ask 
about religion in banking (Bank officer). 
As a result of so many regulations, there is no more mortgage product. The CBA and 
former Mortgage Finance Authority (MFA) released a product without accurately 
studying and assessing the geography and housing data of Egypt. Policies were set 
without inspection of the housing supply (Bank officer). 
  Due to the set up of the Egyptian labor market, the income flow for the 
borrower is never consistent for the duration of mortgage tenor. It becomes important 
for the lender to react accordingly, which creates more fluctuations in operations than 
necessary (Mortgage company officer). 
  There are a number of new barriers to mortgage finance that have appeared post 
the 2011 revolution. The rise of illegal land developers has presented new competition 
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to existing developers, further cramping mortgage finance. Another such new barrier 
is that people are more unsure of the future now than before, and do not want a long-
term burden of a loan (Mortgage company officer). 
  The model of real estate sales is very unique in Egypt. Here, most sales occur 
off plan, before the construction of the actual units. There is no physical unit to 
transfer as an asset. The way the mortgage law and regulations are set make it 
impossible for most selling to happen through mortgages (Real-estate developer 
officer). Also, the 2008 utilities amendment to mortgage regulations stopped all bank 
financing in new cities (Bank officer). 
  Rumors associated with foreign developers about money being drawn out of 
Egypt have served to further slow down the growth of the mortgage market. Such 
rumors have led to tightened CBE surveillance that financing is reaching end users 
(Bank officer). As regulator control and surveillance is tightened, lenders are 
discouraged from pursuing the mortgage market deeper.  
  The real estate market is perceived by regulators as highly volatile and risky. 
The risk is partially due to the long time period associated with a mortgage loan 
combined with the devaluation of real estate prices over time (Regulatory agency 
officer). 
  Some lenders claim that employees of notaries often encourage halting of 
mortgages. They are not supportive of the market activity and regard it a hassle. 
Furthermore, they are working in outdated methods.  
  Mortgage lenders take on two risks. One is the client defaulting. The other is the 
developer not completing construction, which is a problem because most demand for 
mortgages is in new cities (Mortgage company officer). 
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VI. Recommendations 
 As the case with barriers, different players in the mortgage market shared many 
of the same recommendations. Recommendations from those involved are more 
important than anything that can be read or any models that can be applied. The 
opinions of those who have been involved, who know the process and its specifics 
inside out, can be considered the most realistic guidelines to improving the status 
mortgage market in Egypt. 
A. Awareness 
 Many lenders agree that collective mortgage awareness is long overdue. This 
includes awareness by the market regulators and lenders, and mostly by the intended 
clients. One mortgage company comments on overdue awareness by clarifying that 
advertising needs to come before the product, not after it (Mortgage company officer). 
Another mortgage company is experimenting with the possibility of a national 
mortgage awareness campaign, but it is still at the idea phase (Mortgage company 
officer). The Egyptian Banking Institute (EBI) is a provider of mortgage training and 
coursework, and also realizes the lack in awareness. They claim that, at least on the 
short term, mortgage awareness campaigns should target those of age to be bankable. 
Nevertheless, the concept being bankable has to start from school education 
(Regulatory agency officer). This includes even slight education of the financial 
market and its different instruments so students are brought up with some 
understanding and not complete obliviousness to finance. While lenders know 
awareness is lacking, many are not hopeless. A leading lender believes that with 
increased work on mortgage awareness, it will become part of our cultural, as was the 
case with credit cards and car loans that slowly infiltrated people’s behavior 
(Mortgage company officer). 
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 With discussion of recommendations, different market players specified 
divisions of roles. 
B. Areas of work on the part the government, including mortgage market 
regulators: 
 Most recommendations for government actors and regulators are specific to the 
documentation aspect of mortgage lending. Many lenders realize that property 
valuation is problematic and some recommend that the government must change the 
infrastructure related to appraisers, particularly the space surveys authority which is, 
very much inconveniently, under the Ministry of Irrigation (Mortgage company 
officer). Another lender recommends the privatization of space surveys. It now takes 
up to six months to get a survey date, which slows down the entire mortgage process, 
a privatized service would be more dedicated and efficient (Mortgage company 
officer). Another lender claims that the restructuring of mortgage-related institutional 
infrastructure is so vital that one recommendation is to start over. The lender states, 
“Fixing the mortgage situation must start with infrastructure: do this first for five 
years then look at mortgages” (Bank officer). 
 The role of regulators should also entail ironing out problems with New Urban 
Communities Council NUCA and enabling it to have real enforcement on units 
(Mortgage company officer). NUCA is particularly important to mortgage lending 
because most demand of mortgage finance is in the new cities, which are regulated 
and managed by NUCA. However, NUCA has limited decision-making capacity. 
 Several lenders made recommendations specific to the role of EFSA. EFSA 
should help facilitate the mortgage procedure. It must become more advanced as an 
authority of the government. For example, EFSA insists on lenders using specific, 
outdated forms instead of programs like Microsoft Excel (Mortgage company officer). 
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Other lenders agree that instead of constantly tightening controls on lenders, EFSA 
should market the mortgage product (Bank officer). One suggestion of promoting 
mortgages is the consideration of tax exemptions for employees who have taken a 
mortgage (Mortgage company officer). Lobbying for such policy change can best be 
achieved through the efforts of a regulator of the mortgage market. 
 With regard to legislation, specifically Law 148, some lenders claim that it must 
be revisited and changed to match the reality of the housing market. Moreover, 
regulators should consider the period since the implementation of the law a 
‘demonstration period’ and listen to lenders for feedback on that period (Bank 
officer). 
C. Areas of work on the part of lenders and mortgage professionals: 
 While most lenders believe they are doing the best they could under the current 
regulations and market environment, some have improvement suggestions. For 
example, one lender claims that since mortgage in Egypt is tailored and case-specific, 
it is very important for mortgage professionals to have a legal background and to 
speak the legal language. A legal background is also important due to dependence of 
mortgages on legal documentation (Mortgage company officer). 
 Another recommendation is that, collectively, the lenders need to standardize 
documentation and improve overall service quality to be more user-friendly; and 
being more user-friendly is a result of standardized documents and an improved 
service quality. “We need to all stand on the same side,” claims Bassiouny, and 
standing on the same side starts with standardizing documents (Mortgage company 
officer). 
 As a regulator, EFSA has more suggestions for lenders. It believes that the 
mortgage product should be improved to fit most potential borrowers. This includes 
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the reduction of fees and the service being made smoother. Lenders should participate 
in policy change along with EFSA as they are the ones in the market and know it 
better (Regulatory agency officer). However, in its criticism of the high cost of 
mortgage, EFSA does not note that a lot of mortgage-associated fees are not charged 
by lenders, but rather as a cost of legal fees. And while EFSA claims that lenders 
should participate in policy change, none of the lenders participating in this research 
noted that EFSA lends a hearing ear. 
D. Synchronization 
 Several market players made recommendations associated with the overall 
synchronization of the market. Such synchronization must occur at different levels. 
First, there must be synchronization between authorities. Lenders are a tool in the 
mortgage market, and not the creator. New, harmonious policies must be 
implemented (Bank officer). Since every ingredient in the mortgage market has 
seemed to demonstrate a major problem, it is important that the market must be seen 
in a synchronized view from the top. Synchronization does not necessarily mean 
centralization. While some mortgages professionals would like to see a single entity 
in charge of the whole mortgage market, others have smaller hopes. For example, 
even if the mortgage market is never centralized, there should be, at least, specialized 
mortgage notaries (Mortgage company officer). 
 One professional made the recommendation of the Egyptian mortgage market 
adopting the Canadian mortgage model. This includes establishing a national agency 
for mortgage finance to undertake the responsibility of implementing a national plan. 
This agency should have an executive role, as in to have the capacity and authority to 
fully execute its plan (Mortgage company officer). Other professionals agree, with 
one citing that mortgage finance is a tool and it needs a platform (Mortgage company 
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officer). Such a national agency would be a fitting platform. 
E. Other recommendations 
  Mortgages will be more successful when people live according to needs not 
wants. “Everyone wants to live in three-hundred square meters when all they really 
need is eighty square meters” (Mortgage company officer). 
  The mortgage market has been functioning in the US for forty-five years, in 
India for fifty-five years, in Canada for fifty years, and in the UK for forty years: 
these countries have nearly surpassed most problems (at least before the 2009 
collapse of the US secondary market) and should be used as models. However, our 
infrastructure is different, especially when it comes to property registration (Bank 
officer). 
  One particularly interesting recommendation for the mortgage market was a 
suggestion to resort to a different type of financing altogether, particularly, the 
adoption of Islamic banking for mortgages. Islamic mortgages, because of rent-based 
schemes, would allow the market to skip most of the processing effort in legal work 
(Bank officer). 
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VII. Research Implications and Conclusion 
 Findings lead to prove one part of the hypothesis for this research, institutional 
immaturity is behind the lack of use of mortgages as a housing finance mechanism. 
Most, if not all of, the barriers cited by the experts and prominent players of the 
market lead back the issue of institutional immaturity; to name a few, lack of 
synchronization, lack of a secondary market, lack of leadership, difficulty in the 
foreclosure process, and the cultural drive away from mortgages are all signs of an 
institution that is not yet fully developed, or immature.  
 While the security aspect of the hypothesis of this research- a lack of security on 
all sides involved that result in a cyclical trend away from mortgages- did not prove 
true as strongly as the institutional immaturity part, the assumption behind it led to 
other answers that are very much true. Barriers to efficient housing finance could be 
summed up into lack of synchronization in the institutional structure for mortgages 
due to incompletely developed policies.  
 The status of the market as it is implies that mortgages are stagnant, or at least 
the market is not as active as it should be, at least according to market players’ 
criticisms of EFSA data and claims of double-counting. After such research, some 
insights are apparent. As long as banks do not feel they have the support of a strong 
mortgage system, they will continue to be conservative. As long as bureaucracies do 
not have a strong understanding of modern-day mortgages, they will continue to 
cripple market movement. And as long as the market is crippled by inefficiencies, it 
will not attract investors, whether in the primary or secondary markets. 
 Research also implies that the mortgage market cannot function efficiently as 
long as it is as segmented as it is under its current standing. As noted above, at least 
five different agencies operating under various departments of government are 
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involved in the process of registration alone. As described by research participants, 
each is pulling the mortgage market into a different direction and thus may offer one 
explanation to why the market moving with such difficulty.  
 Rule of law has an impeding influence on the mortgage market in the case of 
Egypt. Rather, the weak rule of law is further hindrance to the stagnant market. When 
it takes years to foreclose on a property, as is the case at present, banks and other 
financiers can be easily discouraged from mortgage finance. Both buyers and sellers 
choose less complicated finance and sales routes that minimize legal procedures and 
the role, or rule, of law.  
 Research demonstrates the importance of listening to players from within the 
market. Collectively, there seem to be some very solid ideas about how to take the 
mortgage market forward. It is important that the experience of these players is 
utilized in policy change. The blame for market performance cannot be blindly placed 
on regulators being too bureaucratic and inefficient or on banks being too 
conservative or on misguided consumers. There is the issue of policy that was not set 
right in the first place. Actors cannot be blamed for lack of adequate performance in 
an unsuitable environment. Successful policy must be made to fit the status quo. If the 
housing supply cannot be changed, the policy should fit it from the beginning. Either 
the infrastructure should be changed, which in the case of Egypt’s real estate stock, is 
not doable, or the corresponding policy. Change in policy is especially relevant to 
new communities as city planning is not only selling land and building roads and 
utilities, but also setting a plan for the movement of population into new communities.  
 Support for policy change has to come from both regulators and lenders, who 
both have a clear understanding of why the market might not be performing up to 
standard. As many lenders have claimed, starting over with the mortgage law is 
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optimal. Members of regulating institutions, lending institutions, and developers must 
be listened to in this policy change. Since change in regulations can happen through 
ministerial decrees but a change of law must come through parliament, it is vital that 
parliament listens to members of these groups. The formation of a dedicated group, 
possibly through the already existing mortgage association, as an advisory board to 
parliament policy change, would be highly beneficial. 
 When assessing the mortgage market from a policy perspective, we have found 
that there are numerous implications and lessons that can be applied to other areas of 
policy making and policy change. First and foremost, it is crucial that new policies are 
made to fit the existing state of affairs. Also, there must be cohesion between the 
different players associated with policy; this includes the industry that policy affects 
and its regulators.  
 While this research has not led to a definitive solution or set of solutions to 
problems in the Egyptian mortgage market, it does pinpoint those problems based on 
real experiences, possibly leading to further research that would lead to tangible 
solutions. For example, it is important to consider next the possibility and logistics of 
creating a single, national mortgage agency to undertake the entire process. This 
agency, like the CBE, would be an independent government body responsible for 
mortgaged housing stock from registration to foreclosure or repayment completion, 
and entailing the entire scope of details in between. Also, future research could 
address suitable mortgage models from other countries that would fit the scenario in 
Egypt. Instead of different players following different models- for example, EHFC 
trained by an Indian corporation and EMRC promoting the Canadian model- a unified 
model to follow would create cohesion in the Egyptian mortgage market. However, 
deeper research is needed to assess whether a single model is viable. 
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The interview guide for regulating institutions was composed of the following 
discussion topic areas: 
1. Degree of enforcement of maximum restriction of 5% of banks’ lending 
portfolio to real estate lending; 
a. Inspection and inspection frequency 
b. Consequences in case of maximum limit exceeded 
2. Awareness of volume of mortgage lending in the Egyptian market;  
a. How information is shared among lenders 
b. How [specific] institution compares to other lenders 
3. Specification of problems associated with the Egyptian mortgage market; 
4. What lenders could do differently;  
5. The question of security: 
a. Security concerns and measures of guarantee for lenders 
b. Security concerns and measures of guarantee for borrowers 
c. Government regulations that guarantee security for both sides 
d. Security concerns lacking guarantee 
e. What, if any, extra measures should lending institutions undertake to 
decrease borrower risk 
f. How should lending institutions treat borrowers with minimal (or zero) 
credit history 
6. Also, if not brought up in discussion, opinions and statements on the following 
topics: 
a. Property registration, including but not limited to: 
i. How the regulating institution enforces ‘eligibility to be 
registered’ rule 
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ii. Whether the regulating institution provides any assistance to 
borrowers in property registration 
b. Foreclosure, including but not limited to: 
i. Degree of severity by which regulating institution enforces 
foreclosure 
ii. Whether regulating institution allows continuance of mortgage 
after a borrower in default corrects payment 
iii. Examples (anonymous) of foreclosure cases, if available 
c. Mortgage professional training and education,  
i. Mortgage-specific training and/or education requirement for 
regulating institution staff 
ii. Internal mortgage-specific professional development 
d. Credit bureaus, including but not limited to: 
i. Risk assessment and management 
ii. Examples (anonymous) of rejected borrowers, if available, due 
to poor credit rating. 
The interview guide for lending institutions was composed of the following 
discussion topic areas: 
1. Volume of mortgage lending by institution; 
a. Internal awareness (employees of institution) 
b. Degree to which volume of mortgage lending is publicly disclosed 
2. Awareness of volume of mortgage lending in the Egyptian market;  
a. How information is shared among lenders 
b. How [specific] institution compares to other lenders 
3. Specification of problems associated with the Egyptian mortgage market; 
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4. What lenders could do differently;  
5. How the government through the Central Bank could better regulate; 
6. The question of security: 
a. Security concerns and measures of guarantee for lenders 
b. Security concerns and measures of guarantee for borrowers 
c. Government regulations that guarantee security for both sides 
d. Security concerns lacing guarantee  
e. What, if any, extra measures the [specific] institution undertakes to 
decrease borrower risk 
f. How the [specific] institution treats borrowers with minimal (or zero) 
credit history 
7. How decision was reached by [specific] institution to enter mortgage market; 
a. To what extent is the market meeting expectations of [specific] 
institution; 
b. How mortgage products have evolved with market penetration and 
experience; 
8. Also, if not brought up in discussion, opinions and statements on the following 
topics: 
a. Property registration, including but not limited to: 
i. How the [specific] institution enforces ‘eligibility to be 
registered’ rule 
ii. Whether the [specific] institution provides any assistance to 
borrowers in property registration 
b. Foreclosure, including but not limited to: 
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i. Degree of severity by which [specific] institution enforces 
foreclosure 
ii. Whether [specific] institution allows continuance of mortgage 
after a borrower in default corrects payment 
iii. Examples (anonymous) of foreclosure cases, if available 
c. Mortgage professional training and education,  
i. Mortgage-specific training and/or education requirement for 
[specific] institution staff 
ii. Internal mortgage-specific professional development 
d. Credit bureaus, including but not limited to: 
i. Risk assessment and management 
ii. Examples (anonymous) of rejected borrowers, if available, due 
to poor credit rating. 
The interview guide for developers was composed of the following discussion topic 
areas: 
1. Awareness of volume of mortgage lending in the Egyptian market; including 
how information is accessed by or made available to developers 
2. Which, if any, lending institutions maintain partnerships or agreements with 
developer 
a. Agreement details and terms 
b. Scenarios where collaboration was or was not successful  
3. Details of different payment options with a focus on comparison of installment 
plans to mortgage plans offered by lenders 
 
4. Specification of problems associated with the Egyptian mortgage market; 
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5. The question of security from the perspective of the developer as a sales agent: 
a. Security concerns and measures of guarantee for lenders 
b. Security concerns and measures of guarantee for borrowers 
c. Government regulations that guarantee security for both sides 
d. Security concerns lacking guarantee measure for lenders, borrowers, 
and developers (as sellers) 
e. What, if any, extra measures the developer undertakes to decrease 
buyer payment risk in the case of payment in installments 
f. How the developer treats buyers with minimal (or zero) credit history 
in the case of payment in installments 
6. Also, if not brought up in discussion, opinions and statements of the 
developer, as a seller, on the following topics: 
a. Property registration, including but not limited to: 
i. How the developer manages registration of units 
ii. Whether the developer provides any assistance to buyers in 
property registration and transfer of title 
b. Foreclosure, in the case of default of installments in an installment 
payment plan, including but not limited to: 
i. Whether title transfers are completed with outstanding 
installments yet to be paid by the buyer 
ii. Degree of severity by which developer enforces foreclosure; 
grace periods 
iii. Whether developers allows continuance of purchase after a 
buyer in default corrects payment installments 
iv. Examples (anonymous) of foreclosure cases, if available 
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c. Real-estate sales professional training and education,  
i. Payment plan-specific training and/or education requirement 
for [specific] developer staff 
ii. Internal sales-specific professional development 
d. Credit bureaus, including but not limited to: 
i. Risk assessment and management 
ii. Examples (anonymous) of rejected buyers, if available, due to 
poor credit rating or demonstration of inability to pay in full for 
unit(s)  
 
 
